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1 INTRODUCTION 
Over two decades ago a “quite revolution”, as Charniak 
(1995) once called it, overwhelmingly replaced knowledge-
based approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by 
quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learn-
ing) methods. In recent years, however, the terms ontology, 
semantic web and semantic computing have been in vogue, 
and regardless of how these terms are being used (or mis-
used) we believe that this ‘semantic counter revolution’ is a 
positive trend since corpus-based approaches to NLP, while 
useful in some language processing tasks – see (Ng and 
Zelle, 1997) for a good review – cannot account for compo-
sitionality and productivity in natural language, not to men-
tion the complex inferential patterns that occur in ordinary 
language use. The inferences we have in mind here can be 
illustrated by the following example: 
 
(1) Pass that car will you.  
 a. He is really annoying me. 
 b. They are really annoying me. 
Clearly, speakers of ordinary language can easily infer that 
‘he’ in (1a) refers to the person driving [that] car, while 
‘they’ in (1b) is a reference to the people riding [that] car. 
Such inferences, we believe, cannot theoretically be learned 
(how many such examples will be needed?), and are thus 
beyond the capabilities of any quantitative approach. On the 
other hand, and although it is our firm belief that purely 
quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for 
NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to 
the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP (e.g., 
Lenat and Ghua, 1990) are somewhat justified. While lan-
guage ‘understanding’ is for the most part a commonsense 
‘reasoning’ process at the pragmatic level, as example (1) 
illustrates, the knowledge structures that an NLP system 
must utilize should have sound linguistic and ontological 
underpinnings and must be formalized if we ever hope to 
build scalable systems (or as John McCarthy once said, if 
we ever hope to build systems that we can actually under-
stand!). Thus, and as we have argued elsewhere (Saba, 
2007), we believe that both trends are partly misguided and 
that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an 
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ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of 
the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. 
Specifically, we argue that very little progress within logical 
semantics have been made in the past several years due to 
the fact that these systems are, for the most part, mere sym-
bol manipulation systems that are devoid of any content. In 
particular, in such systems where there is hardly any link 
between semantics and our commonsense view of the 
world, it is quite difficult to envision how one can “un-
cover” the considerable amount of content that is clearly 
implicit, but almost never explicitly stated in our everyday 
discourse. For example, consider the following:  
 
(2) a.   Simon is a rock. 
b. The ham sandwich wants a beer. 
c. Sheba is articulate. 
d. Jon bought a brick house. 
e. Carlos likes to play bridge. 
f. Jon enjoyed the book. 
g. Jon visited a house on every street. 
 
Although they tend to use the least number of words to con-
vey a particular thought (perhaps for computational effec-
tiveness, as Givon (1984) once suggested), speakers of ordi-
nary language clearly understand the sentences in (2) as 
follows: 
 
(3) a.   Simon is [as solid as] a rock. 
b. The [person eating the] ham sandwich wants a beer. 
c. Sheba is [an] articulate [person]. 
d. Jon bought a brick [-made] house. 
e. Carlos likes to play [the game] bridge. 
f. Jon enjoyed [reading/writing] the book. 
g. Jon visited a [different] house on every street. 
 
Clearly, any compositional semantics must somehow ac-
count for this [missing text], as such sentences are quite 
common and are not at all exotic, farfetched, or contrived. 
Linguists and semanticists have usually dealt with such sen-
tences by investigating various phenomena such as meta-
phor (3a); metonymy (3b); textual entailment (3c); nominal 
compounds (3d); lexical ambiguity (3e), co-predication (3f); 
and quantifier scope ambiguity (3g), to name a few. How-
ever, and although they seem to have a common denomina-
tor, it is somewhat surprising that in looking at the literature 
one finds that these phenomena have been studied quite 
independently; to the point where there is very little, if any, 
that seems to be common between the various proposals that 
are often suggested. In our opinion this state of affairs is 
very problematic, as the prospect of a distinct paradigm for 
every single phenomenon in natural language cannot be 
realistically contemplated. Moreover, and as we hope to 
demonstrate in this paper, we believe that there is indeed a 
common symptom underlying these (and other) challenging 
problems in the semantics of natural language.  
 Before we make our case, let us at this very early junc-
ture suggest this informal explanation for the missing text in 
(2): SOLID is (one of) the most salient features of a Rock 
(2a); people, and not a sandwich, have ‘wants’ and EAT is 
the most salient relation that holds between a Human and a 
Sandwich (2b)1; Human is the type of object of which AR-
TICULATE is the most salient property (2c); made-of is 
the most salient relation between an Artifact (and conse-
quently a House) and a substance (Brick) (2d); PLAY is the 
most salient relation that holds between a Human and a 
Game, and not some structure (and, bridge is a game); and, 
finally, in the (possible) world that we live in, a House can-
not be located on more than one Street. The point of this 
informal explanation is to suggest that the problem underly-
ing most challenges in the semantics of natural language 
seems to lie in semantic formalisms that employ logics that 
are mere abstract symbol manipulation systems; systems 
that are devoid of any ontological content. What we suggest, 
instead, is a compositional semantics that is grounded in 
commonsense metaphysics, a semantics that views “logic as 
a language”; that is, a logic that has content, and ontological 
content, in particular, as has been recently and quite con-
vincingly advocated by Cocchiarella (2001). 
 In the rest of the paper we will first propose a semantics 
that is grounded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects 
our commonsense view of reality and the way we talk about 
it in ordinary language; subsequently, we will formalize the 
notion of ‘salient property’ and ‘salient relation’ and suggest 
how a strongly-typed compositional system can possibly 
utilize such information to explain some complex phenom-
ena in natural language. 
2 A TYPE SYSTEM FOR ORDINARY LANGUAGE 
The utility of enriching the ontology of logic by introducing 
variables and quantification is well-known. For example, 
q rp )( ∧ ⊃  is not even a valid statement in propositional 
logic, when p = all humans are mortal, q = Socrates is 
a human and r = Socrates is mortal. In first-order logic, 
however, this inference is easily produced, by exploiting 
one important aspect of variables, namely, their scope. 
However, and as will shortly be demonstrated, copredica-
tion, metonymy and various other problems that are rele-
gated to intensionality in natural language are due the fact 
that another important aspect of a variable, namely its type, 
has not been exploited. In particular, much like scope con-
nects various predicates within a formula, when a variable 
has more than one type in a single scope, type unification is 
the process by which one can discover implicit relationships 
that are not explicitly stated, but are in fact implicit in the 
type hierarchy. To begin with, therefore, we shall first intro-
duce a type system that is assumed in the rest of the paper. 
2.1 The Tree of Language  
In Types and Ontology Fred Sommers (1963) suggested 
several years ago that there is a strongly typed ontology that 
seems to be implicit in all that we say in ordinary spoken 
                                               
1 In addition to EAT, a Human can of course also BUY, SELL, MAKE, PRE-
PARE, WATCH, or HOLD, etc. a Sandwich. Why EAT might be a more salient 
relation between a Person and a Sandwich is a question we shall pay con-
siderable attention to below.  
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language, where two objects x and y are considered to be of 
the same type iff the set of monadic predicates that are sig-
nificantly (that is, truly or falsely but not absurdly) predica-
ble of x is equivalent to the set of predicates that are signifi-
cantly predicable of y. Thus, while they make a references 
to four distinct classes (sets of objects), for an ontologist 
interested in the relationship between ontology and natural 
language, the noun phrases in (4) are ultimately referring to 
two types only, namely Cat and Number: 
 
(4) a.  an old cat 
 b.  a black cat 
 c.  an even number 
 d.  a prime number 
 
In other words, whether we make a reference to an old cat 
or to a black cat, in both instances we are ultimately speak-
ing of objects that are of the same type; and this, according 
to Sommers, is a reflection of the fact that the set of mo-
nadic predicates in our natural language that are signifi-
cantly predicable of old cats is exactly the same set that is 
significantly predicable of black cats. Let us say sp(t,s) is 
true if s is the set of predicates that are significantly predi-
cable of some type t, and let T represent the set of all types 
in our ontology, then 
 
(5) a.  φ≡ ∃ ≠( )[ ( , ) ( )]∈ ∧s sp s st tT  
 b.   sp1 2 1 2 1 2≡ ∃ , [( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )] s ∧ ∧ ⊆s t ts s sp s s s s  
 c.   sp1 2 1 2 1 2= =≡ ∃ , [( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )]s ∧ ∧s t ts s sp s s s s  
 
That is, to be a type (in the ontology) is to have a non-empty 
set of predicates that are significantly predicable (5a) 2; and 
a type s is a subtype of t iff the set of predicates that are 
significantly predicable of s is a subset of the set of predi-
cates that are significantly predicable of t (5b); conse-
quently, the identity of a concept (and thus concept similar-
ity) is well-defined as given by (5c). Note here that accord-
ing to (5a), abstract objects such as events, states, proper-
ties, activities, processes, etc. are also part of our ontology 
since the set of predicates that is significantly predicable of 
any such object is not empty. For example, one can always 
speak of an imminent event, or an event that was cancelled, 
etc., that is   sp etc.{ }Event IMMINENT CANCELLED( , , , ).  In 
addition to events, abstract objects such as states and proc-
esses, etc. can also be predicated; for example, one can al-
ways say idle of a some state, and one always speak of 
starting and terminating a process, etc.  
 In our representation, therefore, concepts belong to two 
quite distinct categories: (i) ontological concepts, such as 
Animal, Substance, Entity, Artefact, Event, State, etc., which 
are assumed to exist in a subsumption hierarchy, and where 
the fact that an object of type Human is (ultimately) an ob-
ject of type Entity is expressed as Human Entity ; and (ii) 
logical concepts, which are the properties (that can be said) 
of and the relations (that can hold) between ontological con-
cepts. To illustrate the difference (and the relation) between 
the two, consider the following: 
                                               
2
 Interestingly, (5a) seems to be related to what Fodor (1998) meant by “to 
be a concept is to be locked to a property”; in that it seems that a genuine 
concept (or a Sommers’ type) is one that `owns’ at least one word/predicate 
in the language. 
(6) 1 : ( :: )old Entityr x  
 2 : ( :: )heavy Physicalr x  
 3 : ( :: )hungry Livingr x  
 4 : ( :: )articulate Humanr x  
 5 : ( :: , :: )Human Artifactr x ymake  
 6 : ( :: , :: )manufacture Human Instrumentr x y  
 7 : ( :: , :: )ride Human Vehicler x y  
 8 : ( :: , :: )drive Human Carr x y  
 
The predicates in (6) are supposed to reflect the fact that in 
ordinary spoken we language we can say OLD of any Entity; 
that we say HEAVY of objects that are of type Physical; that 
HUNGRY is said of objects that are of type Living; that AR-
TICULATE is said of objects that must be of type Human; 
that make is a relation that can hold between a Human and 
an Artefact; that manufacture is a relation that can hold 
between a Human and an Instrument, etc. Note that the type 
assignments in (6) implicitly define a type hierarchy as that 
shown in figure 1 below. Consequently, and although not 
explicitly stated in (6), in ordinary spoken language one can 
always attribute the property HEAVY to an object of type Car 
since   Car Vehicle Physical . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The type hierarchy implied by (6) 
 
In addition to logical and ontological concepts, there are 
also proper nouns, which are the names of objects; objects 
that could be of any type. A proper noun, such as sheba, is 
interpreted as 
 
(7)   sheba  
 
1
P P[( )( ( :: ,‘ ’) ( :: ))]∃⇒ ∧λ x x sheba xnoo Thing t  
 
where x sThingnoo( :: , )  is true of some individual object x 
(which could be any Thing), and s if (the label) s is the name 
of x, and t is presumably the type of objects that P applies to 
(to simplify notation, however, we will often write (7) as 
1
P P∃  [( :: )( ( :: ))]⇒ Thing tsheba sheba shebaλ ). Consider 
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now the following, where ( :: )x Humanteacher , that is, 
where TEACHER is assumed to be a property that is ordinar-
ily said of objects that must be of type Human, and where 
x y( , )BE  is true when x and y are the same objects3: 
 
(8)  sheba is a teacher  
 x
1( :: )( )∃ ∃Thing⇒ sheba  
    ( ( :: ) ( , ))BEx sheba xHuman ∧TEACHER  
 
This states that there is a unique object named sheba (which 
is an object that could be any Thing), and some x such that x 
is a TEACHER (and thus must be an object of type Human), 
and such that sheba is that x. Since ( , )BE sheba x , we can 
replace y by the constant sheba obtaining the following: 
 
(9)  sheba is a teacher  
 x
1( :: )( )∃ ∃Thing⇒ sheba  
    ( ( :: ) ( , ))BEx sheba xHuman ∧TEACHER  
 
1( :: )( ( :: ))∃⇒ sheba shebaThing HumanTEACHER  
 
Note now that sheba is associated with more than one type 
in a single scope. In these situations a type unification must 
occur, where a type unification •( )s t  between two types s 
and t and where Q ∃ ∀, ,∈ { }  is defined (for now) as follows 
 
(10) 
 
 
Q P
Q P if 
Q P if 
Q Q P if msr
otherwise
( :: ( ))( ( ))
( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( )), ( )( ( , ))
,
•



≡ 
∧ ∃ =
⊥
R R R
s t
s s t
t t s
s t s t
x x
x x
x x
x y x y y

  
 
 
 
where R is some salient relation that might exist between 
objects of type s and objects of type t.  That is, in situations 
where there is no subsumption relation between s and t the 
type unification results in keeping the variables of both 
types and in introducing some salient relation between them 
(we shall discuss these situations below).  
 Going to back to (9), the type unification in this case is 
actually quite simple, since Human Thing( ) : 
 
(11)  sheba is a teacher  
 x
1( :: )( )( ( :: ))∃ ∃⇒ sheba shebaThing HumanTEACHER  
 
1( :: ( ))( ( ))•∃⇒ sheba shebaThing Human TEACHER  
 
1( :: )( ( ))∃⇒ sheba shebaHuman TEACHER  
 
In the final analysis, therefore, sheba is a teacher is inter-
preted as follows: there is a unique object named sheba, an 
object that must be of type Human, such that sheba is a 
TEACHER. Note here the clear distinction between ontologi-
cal concepts (such as Human), which Cocchiarella (2001) 
calls first-intension concepts, and logical (or second-
intension) concepts, such as TEACHER(x). That is, what onto-
logically exist are objects of type Human, not teachers, and 
                                               
3
 We are using the fact that, when a is a constant and P is a predicate, 
Pa x Px x a[ ( )]≡ ∃ =∧  (see Gaskin, 1995). 
TEACHER is a mere property that we have come to use to 
talk of objects of type Human 4. In other words, while the 
property of being a TEACHER that x may exhibit is accidental 
(as well as temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact that 
some x is an object of type Human (and thus an Animal, etc.) 
is not. Moreover, a logical concept such as TEACHER is as-
sumed to be defined by virtue of some logical expression 
such as ( :: )( ( ) ),ϕ∀ ≡x xHuman dfTEACHER  where the ex-
act nature of ϕ  might very well be susceptible to temporal, 
cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at 
a certain point in time, a certain community considers a 
TEACHER to be. Specifically, the logical concept TEACHER 
must be defined by some expression such as  
 
( :: )( ( )∀x xHuman TEACHER  
   ( :: )( ( ) ( )))≡ ∃ ∧a a a, xActivitydf teaching agent  
 
That is, any x, which must be an object of type Human, is a 
TEACHER iff x is the agent of some Activity a, where a is a 
TEACHING activity. It is certainly not for convenience, ele-
gance or mere ontological indulgence that a logical concept 
such as TEACHER must be defined in terms of more basic 
ontological categories (such as an Activity) as can be illus-
trated by the following example: 
 
(12)  sheba is a superb teacher  
 
1( :: )( ( :: )∃⇒ sheba shebaThing Humansuperb  
        ( :: ))∧ sheba Humanteacher  
 
Note that in (12), it is sheba, and not her teaching that is 
erroneously considered to be superb. This is problematic on 
two grounds: first, while SUPERB is a property that could 
apply to objects of type Human (such as sheba), the logical 
form in (12) must have a reference to an object of type Ac-
tivity, as SUPERB is a property that could also be said of 
sheba’s teaching activity. This point is more acutely made 
when superb is replaced by adjectives such as certified, 
lousy, etc., where the corresponding properties do not even 
apply to sheba, but are clearly modifying sheba’s teaching 
activity (that it is CERTIFIED, or LOUSY, etc.) We shall dis-
cuss this issue in some detail below. Before we proceed, 
however, we need to extend the notion of type unification 
slightly. 
2.2 More on Type Unification 
It should be clear by now that our ontology, as defined thus 
far, assumes a Platonic universe which admits the existence 
of anything that can be talked about in ordinary language. 
Thus, and as also argued by Cocchiarella (1996), besides 
abstract objects, reference in ordinary language can be made 
to objects that might have or could have existed, as well as 
to objects that might exist sometime in the future. In gen-
eral, therefore, a reference to an object can be5 
                                               
4
 Not recognizing the difference between logical (e.g., TEACHER) and onto-
logical concepts (e.g., Human) is perhaps the reason why ontologies in 
most AI systems are rampant with multiple inheritance. 
5
 We can use ◊a  to state that an object is possibly abstract, instead of 
¬c , which is intended to state that the object is not necessarily concrete 
(or that it does not necessarily actually exist). 
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• a reference to a type (in the ontology): X P X( :: )( ( ))∃ t ; 
• a reference to an object of a certain type, an object that 
must have a concrete existence: X P X( :: )( ( ))∃ ct ; or 
• a reference to an object of a certain type, an object that 
need not actually exist: X P X( :: )( ( ))¬∃ ct . 
 
Accordingly, and as suggested by Hobbs (1985), the above 
necessitates that a distinction be made in our logical form 
between mere being and concrete (or actual) existence. To 
do this we introduce a predicate ( )Exist x  which is true 
when some object x has a concrete (or actual) existence, and 
where a reference to an object of some type is initially as-
sumed to be imply mere being, while actual (or concrete) 
existence is only inferred from the context. The relationship 
between mere being and concrete existence can be defined 
as follows: 
 
(13) a. X P X∃( :: )( ( ))t  
 
  b. cX P X∃( :: )( ( ))t  
      X X P( :: )( )( ( , ) ( ) ( ))≡ ∃ ∃x Inst x Exist x x∧ ∧t  
 
  c. X P X( :: )( ( ))¬∃ ct  
      X X P( :: )( )( ( , ) ( ) ( ))≡ ∃ ∀x Inst x Exist x x⊃∧t  
 
In (13a) we are simply stating that some property P is true 
of some object X of type t. Thus, while, ontologically, there 
are objects of type t that we can speak about, nothing in 
(13a) entails the actual (or concrete) existence of any such 
objects. In (13b) we are stating that the property P is true of 
an object X of type t, an object that must have a concrete (or 
actual) existence (and in particular at least the instance x); 
which is equivalent to saying that there is some object x 
which is an instance of some abstract object X, where x ac-
tually exists, and where P is true of x. Finally, (13c) states 
that whenever some x, which is an instance of some abstract 
object X of type t exists, then the property P is true of x. 
Thus, while (13a) makes a reference to a kind (or a type in 
the ontology), (13b) and (13c) make a reference to some 
instance of a specific type, an instance that may or may not 
actually exist. To simplify notation, therefore, we can write 
(13b) and (13c) as follows, respectively:  
 
X P X( :: )( ( ))∃ ct  
P XX X≡ ∃ ∃( :: ) ( ( ))( ) ( , ) ( )t ∧ ∧x Inst x Exist x  
P≡ ∃ :: ( ( ))( ) ( )t ∧x Exist x x  
 
X P X( :: )( ( ))¬∃ ct  
PX X≡ ∃ ∀( :: ) ( ( ))( ) ( , ) ( )⊃t x Inst x Exist x x∧  
P≡ ∀ :: ( ( ))( ) ( )⊃tx Exist x x  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that x in (13b) is assumed to 
have actual/concrete existence assuming that the prop-
erty/relation P is actually true of x. If the truth of P(X) is just 
a possibility, then so is the concrete existence of some in-
stance x of X. Formally, we have the following: 
 
X P X X P X
¬∃ ≡ ∃( :: )( ( ( ))) ( :: )( ( )) cancan c ct t  
 
Finally, and since different relations and properties have 
different existence assumptions, the existence assumptions 
implied by a compound expression is determined by type 
unification, which is defined as follows, and where the basic 
type unification ( )•s t  is that defined in (10): 
 
( :: ( )) ( :: ( ) )• •= x xc cs t s t  
( :: ( )) ( :: ( ) )¬ ¬• •= x xc cs t s t  
( :: ( )) ( :: ( ) )¬• •=  x xc c cs t s t  
 
As a first example consider the following (where temporal 
and modal auxiliaries are represented as superscripts on the 
predicates): 
 
(14)  jon needs a computer  
  X∃ ∃1( :: )( :: )⇒ Human Computerjon  
        NEED( ( , :: ))does Thingjon X  
 
In (14) we are stating that some unique object named jon, 
which is of type Human does NEED something we call Com-
puter. On the other hand, consider now the interpretation of 
‘jon fixed a computer’: 
 
(15)  jon fixed a computer  
  X
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon⇒ Human Computer  
           ( ( , :: ))did jon X cThingFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: ( ))•∃ ∃ jon⇒ cHuman Computer Thing  
              ( ( , ))did jon XFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ jon⇒ cHuman Computer  
              ( ( , ))did jon XFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon⇒ Human Computer  
               X( )( ( , ))( , ) ( )∃ didx x x jon XInst Exist∧ ∧ FIX  
  ∃ ∃1( :: )( :: )⇒ jon xHuman Computer  
                FIX( ( , ))( ) didExist x jon x∧  
 
That is, ‘jon fixed a computer’ is interpreted as follows: 
there is a unique object named jon, which is an object of 
type Human, and some x of type Computer (an x that actu-
ally exists) such that jon did FIX x. However, consider now 
the following: 
 
 (16)  jon can fix a computer  
  X1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon⇒ Human Computer  
           ( ( , :: ))¬can jon X cThingFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: ( ))¬•∃ ∃ jon⇒ cHuman Computer Thing  
       ( ( , ))can jon XFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: )¬∃ ∃ jon⇒ cHuman Computer  
       ( ( , ))can jon XFIX  
  X1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon⇒ Human Computer  
       X( ( , ))( ) ( , ) ( )∀ canx x x jon XInst Exist ⊃∧ FIX  
  ∃ ∃1( :: )( :: )⇒ jon xHuman Computer  
               FIX∀ ( ( , ))( ) ( )⊃ canx Exist x jon x  
 
Essentially, therefore, ‘jon can fix a computer’ is stating that 
whenever an object x of type Computer exists, then jon can 
fix x; or, equivalently, that ‘jon can fix any computer’.   
 Finally, consider the following, where it is assumed that 
our ontology reflects the commonsense fact that we can 
always speak of an Animal climbing some Physical object: 
 
 a snake can climb a tree  
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X Y( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Snake Tree  
          X( ( :: , :: ))¬ ¬can  Yc cAnimal PhysicalCLIMB  
X Y( :: ( ))( :: ( ))¬ ¬• •∃ ∃ ⇒ c cSnake Animal Tree Physical  
          X( ( , ))can YCLIMB  
XX Y( :: )( :: )( ( , ))¬ ¬∃ ∃ can  Y⇒ c cSnake Tree CLIMB  
X Y( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Snake Tree  
  X Y( )( )( ( , ) ( ) ( , )∀ ∀ x x yx y Inst Exist Inst∧ ∧  
               ( , ))( ) cany x yExist ⊃∧ CLIMB  
( :: )( :: )∀ ∀x y⇒ Snake Tree  
        ( , ))( ( ) ( ) canx y x yExist Exist ⊃∧ CLIMB  
 
That is, ‘a snake can climb a tree’ is essentially interpreted 
as any snake (if it exists) can climb any tree (if it exists). 
 With this background, we now proceed to tackle some 
interesting problems in the semantics of natural language. 
3 SEMANTICS WITH ONTOLOGICAL CONTENT 
In this section we discuss several problems in the semantic 
of natural language and demonstrate the utility of a seman-
tics embedded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our 
commonsense view of reality and the way we take about it 
in ordinary language. 
3.1 Types, Polymorphism and Nominal Modification 
We first demonstrate the role type unification and polymor-
phism plays in nominal modification. Consider the sentence 
in (1) which could be uttered by someone who believes that: 
(i) Olga is a dancer and a beautiful person; or (ii) Olga is 
beautiful as a dancer (i.e., Olga is a dancer and she dances 
beautifully). 
 
(17) Olga is a beautiful dancer 
 
As suggested by Larson (1998), there are two possible 
routes to explain this ambiguity: one could assume that a 
noun such as ‘dancer’ is a simple one place predicate of 
type ,e t〈 〉  and ‘blame’ this ambiguity on the adjective; al-
ternatively, one could assume that the adjective is a simple 
one place predicate and blame the ambiguity on some sort 
of complexity in the structure of the head noun (Larson calls 
these alternatives A-analysis and N-analysis, respectively). 
 In an A-analysis, an approach advocated by Siegel 
(1976), adjectives are assumed to belong to two classes, 
termed predicative and attributive, where predicative adjec-
tives (e.g., red, small, etc.) are taken to be simple functions 
from entities to truth-values, and are thus extensional and 
intersective: =     Adj Noun Adj Noun∩ . Attributive 
adjectives (e.g., former, previous, rightful, etc.), on the other 
hand, are functions from common noun denotations to 
common noun denotations – i.e., they are predicate modifi-
ers of type , , ,e t e t〈〈 〉 〈 〉〉 , and are thus intensional and non-
intersective (but subsective:    Adj Noun Noun⊆ ). On 
this view, the ambiguity in (17) is explained by posting two 
distinct lexemes (beautiful1  and beautiful2 ) for the adjec-
tive beautiful, one of which is an attributive while the other 
is a predicative adjective. In keeping with Montague’s 
(1970) edict that similar syntactic categories must have the 
same semantic type, for this proposal to work, all adjectives 
are initially assigned the type , , ,e t e t〈〈 〉 〈 〉〉  where intersec-
tive adjectives are considered to be subtypes obtained by 
triggering an appropriate meaning postulate. For example, 
assuming the lexeme beautiful1  is marked (for example by 
a lexical feature such as +INTERSECTIVE), then the meaning 
postulate P Q x Q x P x Q x∃ ∀ ∀ [ ( )( ) ( ) ( )]↔beautiful ∧  does 
yield an intersective meaning when P is beautiful1 ; and 
where a phrase such as `a beautiful dancer' is interpreted as 
follows6: 
 
 1 a beautiful dancer  
P x x x P x∃[( )( ( ) ( ) ( ))]⇒ λ dancer beautiful∧ ∧  
 2 a beautiful dancer  
P x x P x∃[( )( (ˆ ( )) ( ))]⇒ λ beautiful dancer ∧  
 
While it does explain the ambiguity in (17), several reserva-
tions have been raised regarding this proposal. As Larson 
(1995; 1998) notes, this approach entails considerable du-
plication in the lexicon as this means that there are ‘dou-
blets’ for all adjectives that can be ambiguous between an 
intersective and a non-intersective meaning. Another objec-
tion, raised by McNally and Boleda (2004), is that in an A-
analysis there are no obvious ways of determining the con-
text in which a certain adjective can be considered intersec-
tive. For example, they suggest that the most natural reading 
of (18) is the one where beautiful is describing Olga’s danc-
ing, although it does not modify any noun and is thus 
wrongly considered intersective by modifying Olga. 
 
(18) Look at Olga dance. She is beautiful. 
 
While valid in other contexts, in our opinion this observa-
tion does not necessarily hold in this specific example since 
the resolution of `she' must ultimately consider all entities in 
the discourse, including, presumably, the dancing activity 
that would be introduced by a Davidsonian representation of 
‘Look at Olga dance’ (this issue is discussed further below).  
 A more promising alternative to the A-analysis of the 
ambiguity in (17) has been proposed by Larson (1995, 
1998), who suggests that beautiful in (17) is a simple inter-
sective adjective of type 〈e,t〉 and that the source of the am-
biguity is due to a complexity in the structure of the head 
noun. Specifically, Larson suggests that a deverbal noun 
such as dancer should have the Davidsonian representation 
∀ = ∃x x e e e x∧dfDANCER DANCING AGENT( )( ( ) ( )( ( ) ( , )))  i.e., 
any x is a dancer iff x is the agent of some dancing activity 
(Larson’s notation is slightly different). In this analysis, the 
ambiguity in (1) is attributed to an ambiguity in what beau-
tiful is modifying, in that it could be said of Olga or her 
dancing Activity. That is, (17) is to be interpreted as follows: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful dancer  
∃e e e olga⇒ ∧( )( ( ) ( , )dancing agent                        
             e olga∧ ∨( ( ) ( )))beautiful beautiful  
                                               
6
 Note that as an alternative to meaning postulates that specialize intersec-
tive adjectives to ,e t〈 〉 , one can perform a type-lifting operation from 
,e t〈 〉 to , , ,e t e t〈〈 〉 〈 〉〉 (see Partee, 2007). 
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In our opinion, Larson’s proposal is plausible on several 
grounds. First, in Larson’s N-analysis there is no need for 
impromptu introduction of a considerable amount of lexical 
ambiguity. Second, and for reasons that are beyond the am-
biguity of beautiful in (17), and as argued in the interpreta-
tion of example (12) above, there is ample evidence that the 
structure of a deverbal noun such as dancer must admit a 
reference to an abstract object, namely a dancing Activity; as, 
for example, in the resolution of ‘that’ in (19). 
 
(19) Olga is an old dancer. 
  She has been doing that for 30 years. 
 
Furthermore, and in addition to a plausible explanation of 
the ambiguity in (17), Larson’s proposal seems to provide a 
plausible explanation for why ‘old’ in (4a) seems to be am-
biguous while the same is not true of ‘elderly’ in (4b): `old’ 
could be said of Olga or her teaching; while elderly is not an 
adjective that is ordinarily said of objects that are of type 
activity: 
 
(20) a. Olga is an old dancer. 
  b. Olga is an elderly teacher. 
 
With all its apparent appeal, however, Larson’s proposal is 
still lacking. For one thing, and it presupposes that some 
sort of type matching is what ultimately results in rejecting 
the subsective meaning of elderly in (20b), the details of 
such processes are more involved than Larson’s proposal 
seems to imply. For example, while it explains the ambigu-
ity of beautiful in (17), it is not quite clear how an N-
Analysis can explain why beautiful does not seem to admit a 
subsective meaning in (21). 
 
(21) Olga is a beautiful young street dancer. 
 
In fact, beautiful in (21) seems to be modifying Olga for the 
same reason the sentence in (22a) seems to be more natural 
than that in (22b).  
 
(22) a.  Maria is a clever young girl. 
  b.  Maria is a young clever girl. 
 
The sentences in (22) exemplify what is known in the litera-
ture as adjective ordering restrictions (AORs). However, 
despite numerous studies of AORs (e.g., see Wulff, 2003; 
Teodorescu, 2006), the slightly differing AORs that have 
been suggested in the literature have never been formally 
justified. What we hope to demonstrate below however is 
that the apparent ambiguity of some adjectives and adjec-
tive-ordering restrictions are both related to the nature of the 
ontological categories that these adjectives apply to in ordi-
nary spoken language. Thus, and while the general assump-
tions in Larson’s (1995; 1998) N-Analysis seem to be valid, 
it will be demonstrated here that nominal modification seem 
to be more involved than has been suggested thus far. In 
particular, it seems that attaining a proper semantics for 
nominal modification requires a much richer type system 
than currently employed in formal semantics.  
First let us begin by showing that the apparent ambiguity 
of an adjective such as beautiful is essentially due to the fact 
that beautiful applies to a very generic type that subsumes 
many others. Consider the following, where we as-
sume ( :: )x Entitybeautiful ; that is that BEAUTIFUL can 
be said of any Entity: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful dancer  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
        a a Olga Human∧ ∧DANCING AGENT( ( ) ( , :: )  
          :: ::( ( ) ( ))a OlgaEntity Entity∨BEAUTIFUL BEAUTIFUL  
 
Note now that, in a single scope, a is considered to be an 
object of type Activity as well as an object of type Entity, 
while Olga is considered to be a Human and an Entity. This, 
as discussed above, requires a pair of type unifications, 
( )Human Entity  and ( )Activity Entity . In this case both 
type unifications succeed, resulting in Human and Activity, 
respectively: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful dancer  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
            a a Olga∧DANCING AGENT( ( ) ( , )  
               ( ( ) ( )))a Olga∧ ∨BEAUTIFUL BEAUTIFUL  
 
In the final analysis, therefore, ‘Olga is a beautiful dancer’ 
is interpreted as: Olga is the agent of some dancing Activity, 
and either Olga is BEAUTIFUL or her DANCING (or, of course, 
both). However, consider now the following, where ELD-
ERLY is assumed to be a property that applies to objects that 
must be of type Human: 
 
 Olga is an elderly teacher  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
       a a Olga Human∧ ∧TEACHING AGENT( ( ) ( , :: )  
           :: ::( ( ) ( )))a OlgaHuman Human∨ELDERLY ELDERLY  
 
Note now that the type unification concerning Olga is triv-
ial, while the type unification concerning a will fail since 
(Activity   •  Human)  = ⊥, thus resulting in the following:  
 
 Olga is an elderly teacher  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
         a a Olga Human∧TEACHING AGENT( ( ) ( , :: )  
            ::( ( ( ))•a Human Activity∧ ELDERLY  
                   ::( ))Olga Human∨ ELDERLY  
1( :: )( :: )( ( )∃ ∃Olga a a⇒ Human Activity TEACHING  
         ⊥a Olga Olga∧ ∧ ∨AGENT ELDERLY( , ) ( ( ))  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
         a a Olga Olga∧ ∧TEACHING AGENT ELDERLY( ( ) ( , ) ( ))  
 
Thus, in the final analysis, ‘Olga is an elderly teacher’ is 
interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named Olga, 
an object that must be of type Human, and an object a of 
type Activity, such that a is a teaching activity, Olga is the 
agent of the activity, and such that elderly is true of Olga. 
3.2 Adjective Ordering Restrictions 
Assuming ( :: )x EntityBEAUTIFUL  - i.e., that beautiful is a 
property that can be said of objects of type Entity, then it is a  
50 W. S. SABA 
  
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Adjectives as polymorphic functions 
 
 
property that can be said of a Cat, a Person, a City, a Movie, 
a Dance, an Island, etc. Therefore, BEAUTIFUL can be 
thought of as a polymorphic function that applies to objects 
at several levels and where the semantics of this function 
depend on the type of the object, as illustrated in figure 2 
below7. Thus, and although BEAUTIFUL applies to objects of 
type Entity, in saying ‘a beautiful car’, for example, the 
meaning of beautiful that is accessed is that defined in the 
type Physical (which could in principal be inherited from a 
supertype). Moreover, and as is well known in the theory of 
programming languages, one can always perform type cast-
ing upwards, but not downwards (e.g., one can always view 
a Car as just an Entity, but the converse is not true)8.  
 Thus, and assuming also that ( :: )x PhysicalRED ; that is, 
assuming that RED can be said of Physical objects, then, for 
example, the type casting that will be required in (23a) is 
valid, while that in (23b) is not.  
 
(23) a. ( ( :: ) :: )x Physical EntityBEAUTIFUL RED  
 b. ( ( :: ) :: )x Entity PhysicalRED BEAUTIFUL  
 
This, in fact, is precisely why ‘Jon owns a beautiful red 
car’, for example, is more natural than ‘Jon owns a red 
beautiful car’. In general, a sequence ( ( :: ) :: )x s t
1 2
a a  is 
a valid sequence iff ( )s t . Note that this is different from 
type unification, in that the unification does succeed in both 
cases in (11). However, before we perform type unification 
                                               
7
 It is perhaps worth investigating the relationship between the number of 
meanings of a certain adjective (say in a resource such as WordNet), and 
the number of different functions that one would expect to define for the 
corresponding adjective.  
8
 Technically, the reason we can always cast up is that we can always ig-
nore additional information. Casting down, which entails adding informa-
tion, is however undecidable. 
the direction of the type casting must be valid. For example, 
consider the following: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful young dancer  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
    a a Olga∧ ∧DANCING AGENT( ( ) ( , )  
           )( ( ( ) )a Activity Physical EntityBEAUTIFUL YOUNG :: :: ::  
               ::( ( )Olga Human∨ BEAUTIFUL YOUNG  
                        :: :: )))Physical Entity  
 
Note now that the type casting required (and thus the order of 
adjectives) is valid since ( )Physical Entity . This means that 
we can now perform the required type unifications which 
would proceed as follows: 
 
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃Olga a⇒ Human Activity  
    a a Olga∧ ∧DANCING AGENT( ( ) ( , )  
           )( ( ( ) )a Activity Physical EntityBEAUTIFUL YOUNG :: :: ::  
               ::( ( )Olga Human∨ BEAUTIFUL YOUNG  
                        :: :: )))Physical Entity  
 
Note now that the type casting required (and thus the order 
of adjectives) is valid since ( )Physical Entity . This means 
that we can now perform the required type unifications 
which would proceed as follows: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful young dancer  
1( :: )( :: ) ,( )∃ ∃Olga a a Olga⇒ Human Activity ∧ AGENT  
       ::( ( ( ( ))•a Activity Physical∧ BEAUTIFUL YOUNG  
              ::( ( ( ))•Olga Human Physical∨ BEAUTIFUL YOUNG  
 
Since ( )• =⊥Activity Physical , the term involving this type 
unification is reduced to ⊥ , and  ( )β⊥ ∨  to β , hence: 
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 Olga is a beautiful young dancer  
1( :: )( :: ) ,( )∃ ∃Olga a a Olga⇒ Human Activity ∧ AGENT  
       ( ( ( )))Olga∧ BEAUTIFUL YOUNG  
 
Note here that since BEAUTIFUL was preceded by YOUNG, it 
could have not been applicable to an abstract object of type 
Activity, but was instead reduced to that defined at the level 
of Physical, and subsequently to that defined at the type 
Human. A valid question that comes to mind here is how 
then do we express the thought ‘Olga is a young dancer and 
she dances beautifully’. The answer is that we usually make 
a statement such as this: 
 
(24) Olga is a young and beautiful dancer. 
 
Note that in this case we are essentially overriding the se-
quential processing of the adjectives, and thus the adjective-
ordering restrictions (or, equivalently, the type-casting 
rules!) are no more applicable. That is, (24) is essentially 
equivalent to two sentences that are processed in parallel: 
 
 Olga is a yong and beautiful dancer  
≡  Olga is a young dancer   
          Olga is a beautiful dancer∧  
 
Note now that ‘beautiful’ would again have an intersective 
and a subsective meaning, although ‘young’ will only apply 
to Olga due to type constraints. 
3.3 Intensional Verbs and Coordination 
Consider the following sentences and their corresponding 
translation into standard first-order logic:  
 
(25) a.  jon found a unicorn  
  ( )( ( ) ( , ))∃x x jon x⇒ ∧UNICORN FIND  
 b.  jon sought a unicorn  
  ( )( ( ) ( , ))∃x x jon x⇒ ∧UNICORN SEEK  
 
Note that ( )( ( ))∃x xUNICORN  can be inferred in both cases, 
although it is clear that ‘jon sought a unicorn’ should not 
entail the existence of a unicorn. In addressing this problem, 
Montague (1960) suggested treating seek as an intensional 
verb that more or less has the meaning of ‘tries to find’; i.e. 
a verb of type 〈〈〈 〉 〉 〈 〉〉e t t e t, , , , , using the tools of a higher-
order intensional logic. To handle contexts where there are 
intensional as well as extensional verbs, mechanisms such 
as the ‘type lifting’ operation of Partee and Rooth (1983) 
were also introduced. The type lifting operation essentially 
coerces the types into the lowest type, the assumption being 
that if ‘jon sought and found’ a unicorn, then a unicorn that 
was initially sought, but subsequently found, must have 
concrete existence.  
 In addition to unnecessary complication of the logical 
form, we believe the same intuition behind the ‘type lifting’ 
operation, which, as also noted by (Kehler et. al., 1995) and 
Winter (2007), fails in mixed contexts containing more than 
tow verbs, can be captured without the a priori separation of 
verbs into intensional and extensional ones, and in particular 
since most verbs seem to function intensionally and 
extensionally depending on the context. To illustrate this 
point further consider the following, where it is assumed 
that ( :: , :: )paint x yHuman Physical ; that is, it is assumed 
that the object of paint does not necessarily (although it 
might) exist: 
 
(26)  jon painted a dog  
 
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon D⇒ Human Dog  
             ( ( :: , :: ))didpaint jon DHuman Physical  
 
1( :: )( :: ( ))•∃ ∃⇒ jon DHuman Dog Physical  
             ( ( , ))didpaint jon D  
 
1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃ did⇒ jon D jon DHuman Dog paint  
 
Thus, ‘Jon painted a dog’ simply states that some unique 
object named jon, which is an object of type Human painted 
something we call a Dog. However, let us now assume 
( : , :: )own x y cHuman Entity ; that is, if some Human owns 
some y then y must actually exist. Consider now all the steps 
in the interpretation of ‘jon painted his dog’:  
 
(27)  
 jon painted his dog  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon D⇒ Human Dog  
           ( ( :: , :: )own jon D cHuman Physical  
                   ( :: , :: ))jon DHuman Entity∧ paint  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon D⇒ Human Dog  
         ( ( , :: ( )) ( , ))•own paint∧jon D jon DcPhysical Entity  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃jon D⇒ Human Dog  
         ( ( , :: ) ( , ))own paintjon D jon DcPhysical ∧  
1( :: )( :: ( ))•∃ ∃ ⇒ jon D cHuman Dog Physical  
         ( ( , ) ( , ))jon D jon D∧own paint  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ⇒ jon D cHuman Dog  
           ( ( , ) ( , ))jon D jon D∧own paint  
 
Thus, that while painting something does not entail its exis-
tence, owning something does, and the type unification of the 
conjunction yields the desired result. As given by the rules 
concerning existence assumptions given in (13) above, the 
final interpretation should now be proceed as follows: 
 
 jon painted his dog  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ jon DHuman Dog
 
           ( )( ( ) ( )∃d Inst d,D Exist d∧  
              ( , ) ( , ))∧ ∧own paintjon d jon d  
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ jon dHuman Dog
 
            ( ( ) ( , ) ( , ))Exist d jon d jon d∧ ∧own paint  
 
That is, ‘jon painted his dog’ is interpreted as follows: there 
is a unique object named jon, which is an object of type 
Human, some object d which of type Dog, such that d actu-
ally exists, jon does OWN d, and jon did PAINT d. The point 
of the above example was to illustrate that the notion of 
intensional verbs can be captured in this simple formalism 
without the type lifting operation, particularly since an ex-
tensional interpretation might at times be implied even if an 
‘intensional’ verb does not coexist with an extensional verb 
in the same context. As an illustrative example, let us as-
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sume x y( :: , :: )Human Eventplan ; that is, that it always 
makes sense to say that some Human is planning (or did 
plan) something we call an Event. Consider now the follow-
ing:  
 
(28)  
 jon planned a trip  
jon e
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Entity Trip  
 jon e( ( :: , :: ))Human Eventplan  
jon e jon e
1( :: )( :: ( ))( ( , ))•∃ ∃ plan⇒ Entity Trip Event  
jon e jon e1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃⇒ Entity Trip plan  
 
That is, ‘jon planned a trip’ simply states that a specific 
object that must be a Human has planned something we call 
a Trip (a trip that might not have actually happened9). 
Assuming e( :: )cEventlengthy , however, i.e., that 
LENGTHY is a property that is ordinarily said of an (existing) 
Event, then the interpretation of ‘john planned the lengthy 
trip’ should proceed as follows: 
 
 jon planned a lengthy trip  
jon e
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Human Trip  
         jon e e( ( , :: )) ( :: ))plan lengthy cEvent Event∧  
 
Since ( ( )) ( )• • = • =  c c cTrip Event Event Trip Event Trip  we 
finally get the following: 
 
(29)  jon planned a lengthy trip  
 jon e1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ⇒ cEntity Trip  
                     jon e e( ( , ) ( ))∧plan lengthy  
 jon e
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Entity Trip  
                     jon( ( , ) ( ) ( ))e e eExist∧ ∧plan lengthy  
 
That is, there is a specific Human named jon that has 
planned a Trip, a trip that actually exists, and a trip that was 
LENGTHY. Finally, it should be noted here that the trip in 
(29) was finally considered to be an existing Event due to 
other information contained in the same sentence. In gen-
eral, however, this information can be contained in a larger 
discourse. For example, in interpreting ‘John planned a trip. 
It was lengthy’ the resolution of ‘it’ would force a retraction 
of the types inferred in processing ‘John planned a trip’, as 
the information that follows will ‘bring down’ the afore-
mentioned Trip from abstract to actual existence (or, from 
mere being to concrete existence). This discourse level 
analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but read-
ers interested in the computational details of such processes 
are referred to (van Deemter & Peters, 1996). 
3.4 Metonymy and Copredication 
In addition to so-called intensional verbs, our proposal 
seems to also appropriately handle other situations that, on 
the surface, seem to be addressing a different issue. For ex-
ample, consider the following: 
                                               
9
  Note that it is the Trip (event) that did not necessarily happen, not the 
planning (Activity) for it.  
(30) Jon read the book and then he burned it. 
 
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that this is an 
example of what they term copredication; which is the pos-
sibility of incompatible predicates to be applied to the same 
type of object. It is argued that in (30), for example, ‘book’ 
must have what is called a dot type, which is a complex 
structure that in a sense carries the ‘informational content’ 
sense (which is referenced when it is being read) as well as 
the ‘physical object’ sense (which is referenced when it is 
being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to 
‘pick out’ the right sense in the right context, and all in a 
well-typed compositional logic. But this approach presup-
poses that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of 
the word ‘book’ in ordinary language10. Moreover, copredi-
cation seems to be a special case of metonymy, where the 
possible relations that could be implied are in fact much 
more constrained. An approach that can explain both no-
tions, and hopefully without introducing much complexity 
into the logical form, should then be more desirable.  
Let us first suggest the following: 
 
(31) a. x y( :: , :: )Human Contentread  
 b. x y( :: , :: )Human Physicalburn  
 
That is, we are assuming here that speakers of ordinary lan-
guage understand ‘read’ and ‘burn’ as follows: it always 
makes sense to speak of a Human that read some Content, 
and of a Human that burned some Physical object. Consider 
now the following: 
 
(32)  jon read a book and then he burned it  
 jon b1∃ ∃⇒ Entity Book( :: )( :: )  
       jon bHuman Content( ( :: , :: ))read  
         jon bHuman Physical∧ ( :: , :: ))burn  
 
The type unification of jon is straightforward, as the agent 
of BURN and READ are of the same type. Concerning b, a 
pair of type unifications • •Book Physical Content(( ) )must 
occur, resulting in the following: 
 
(33)  jon read a book and then he burned it  
 jon b
1∃ ∃ •⇒ Entity Book Content( :: )( :: ( ))  
              jon b jon b( ( , ) ( , )))read burn∧  
 
Since no subsumption relation exists between Book and 
Content, the two variables are kept and a salient relation 
between them is introduced, resulting in the following: 
 
(34)  jon read a book and then he burned it  
 jon b c1∃ ∃ ∃⇒ Entity Book Content( :: )( :: )( :: )  
           b c jon c jon b( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))R read burn∧ ∧  
 
That is, there is some unique object of type Human (named 
jon), some Book b, some content c, such that c is the Con-
tent of b, and such that jon read c and burned b. 
                                               
10
 Similar presuppositions are also made in a hybrid (connection-
ist/symbolic) ‘sense modulation’ approach described in (Rais-Ghasem & 
Corriveau, 1998).  
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 As in the case of copredication, type unifications intro-
ducing an additional variable and a salient relation occurs 
also in situations where we have what we refer to as meton-
ymy. To illustrate, consider the following example: 
 
(35)  the ham sadnwich wants a beer  
       x y
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ HamSandwich Beer  
                     x y( ( :: , :: ))Human Thingwant  
       x y
1( :: )( :: ( ))∃ ∃ •⇒ HamSandwich Beer Thing  
                     x y( ( :: , ))Humanwant  
       x y
1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ HamSandwich Beer  
                     x y( ( :: , ))Humanwant  
 
While the type unification between Beer and Thing is trivial, 
since ( )Beer Thing , the type unification involving the vari-
able x fails since there is no subsumption relationship between 
Human and HamSandwich. As argued above, in these situations 
both types are kept and a salient relation between them is intro-
duced, as follows: 
 
 the ham sadnwich wants a beer  
x z y
1 1( :: )( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ∃⇒ HamSandwich Human Beer  
              x z z y( ( , ) ( , ))R ∧want  
 
where msr=R Human Sandwich( , ) , i.e., where R is as-
sumed to be some salient relation (e.g., EAT, ORDER, etc.) 
that exists between an object of type Human, and an object 
of type Sandwich (more on this below). 
3.5 Types and Salient Relations 
Thus far we have assumed the existence of a function 
msr s t( , )  that returns, if it exists, the most salient relation R 
between two types s and t. Before we discuss what this 
function might look like, we need to extend the notion of 
assigning ontological types to properties and relations 
slightly. Let us first reconsider (1), which is repeated below: 
 
(36) Pass that car, will you.  
 a. He is really annoying me.  
 b. They are really annoying me.  
 
As discussed above we argue that ‘he’ in (36a) refers to ‘the 
person driving [that] car’ while ‘they’ in (36b) refers to ‘the 
people riding in [that] car’. The question here is this: al-
though there are many possible relations between a Person 
and a Car (e.g., DRIVE, RIDE, MANUFACTURE, DESIGN, 
MAKE, etc.) how is it that DRIVE is the one that most speak-
ers assume in (36a), while RIDE is the one most speakers 
would assume in (36b)? Here’s a plausible answer: 
 
• DRIVE is more salient than RIDE, MANUFACTURE, DE-
SIGN, MAKE, etc. since the other relations apply higher-
up in the hierarchy; that is, the fact that we MAKE a Car, 
for example, is not due to Car, but to the fact that MAKE 
can be said of any Artifact and Car Artifact( ) . 
 
• While DRIVE is a more salient relation between a Hu-
man and a Car than RIDE, most speakers of ordinary 
English understand the DRIVE relation to hold between 
one Human and one Car (at a specific point in time), 
while RIDE is a relation that holds between many (sev-
eral, or few!) people and one car. Thus, ‘they’ in (36b) 
fails to unify with DRIVE, and the next most salient rela-
tion must be picked up, which in this case is RIDE. 
 
In other words, the type assignments of DRIVE and RIDE are 
understood by speakers of ordinary language as follows: 
 
x yHuman Car( :: , :: )1 1drive  
x yHuman Car( :: , :: )1+ 1ride  
 
With this background, let us now suggest how the function 
msr( , )s t  that picks out the most salient relation R between 
two types s and t is computed.  
We say ( , )pap tp  when the property P applies to objects 
of type t, and ( , , )rap s tr  when the relation r holds be-
tween objects of type s and objects of type t. We define a 
list ( )lpap t  of all properties that apply to objects of type t, 
and ( , )lrap s t  of all relations that hold between objects of 
type s and objects of type t, as follows: 
 
(37)    =( ) [ ( , )]lpap t pap tp p|  
 
m n
m n= 〈 〉( , ) [ , , ( , , )]lrap s t rap s tr r|  
 
The lists (of lists) *( )lpap t  and *( , )lrap s t  can now be 
inductively defined as follows: 
 
(38)     *( ) [ ]=lpap Thing  
 =
* *( ) ( ) : ( ( ))lpap t lpap t lpap sup t  
 
  
*( , ) [ ]=lrap s Thing  
 =
* *( , ) ( , ) : ( , ( ))lrap s t lrap s t lrap s sup t  
 
where e s( : )  is a list that results from attaching the object e 
to the front of the (ordered) list s, and where ( )sup t  returns 
the immediate (and single!) parent of t. Finally, we now 
define the function m n( , )〈 〉msr s t  which returns most the 
salient relation between objects of type s and t, with con-
straints m and n, respectively, as follows: 
 
m n        ( , ) ( [ ]) ( )〈 〉 = ≠ ⊥msr s t if s then head s else  
where 
a b a m b n= 〈 〉 ≥ ≥∈| ∧ ∧*[ , , ( , ) ( ) ( )]s lrap s tr r  
 
Assuming now the ontological and logical concepts shown 
in figure 1, for example, then 
 
*( )lpap Human  
[[ ,...],[ ,...],[ ,...],,[ ,...],...]= articulate hungry heavy old  
*( , )lrap Human Car
 
[[ ,1,1 ,...],[ ,1 ,1 ,...],,...]+= 〈 〉 〈 〉drive ride  
 
Since these lists are ordered, the degree to which a property 
or a relation is salient is inversely related to the position of 
the property or the relation in the list. Thus, for example, 
while a Human may drive, ride, make, buy, sell, 
build, etc. a Car, drive is a more salient relation between 
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a Human and a Car than ride, which, in turn, is more sali-
ent than manufacture, make, etc. Moreover, assuming 
the above sets we have  
 
1 1〈 〉 =Human Car( , )msr drive  
1 1+〈 〉 =Human Car( , )msr ride  
 
which essentially says drive is the most salient relation in 
a context where we are speaking of a single Human and a 
single Car, and ride is the most salient relation between a 
number of people and a Car. Note now that ‘they’ in (36b) 
can be interpreted as follows: 
 
 They are annoying me  
they me( :: ( ))( :: )∃ • ∃Human Car Human⇒ 1+ 1  
          they me( ( , ))annoying  
they c me∃ ∃ ∃Human Car Human⇒ ( :: )( :: )( :: )1+ 1  
          they c they me∧( ( , ) ( , ))riding annoying  
 
It should be clear from the above that type unification and 
computing the most salient relation between two (ontologi-
cal) types is what determines that Jon enjoyed ‘reading’ the 
book in (39a), and enjoyed ‘watching’ the movie in (39b). 
 
(39) a.  Jon enjoyed the book. 
 b.  Jon enjoyed the movie. 
 
Note however that in addition to READ, an object of type 
Human may also WRITE, BUY, SELL, etc a Book. Similarly, in 
addition to WATCH, an object of type Human may also CRITI-
CIZE, DIRECT, PRODUCE, etc. a Movie. Although this issue is 
beyond the scope of the current paper we simply note that 
picking out the most salient relation is still decidable due to 
tow differences between READ/WRITE and WATCH/DIRECT 
(or WATCH/PRODUCE): (i) the number of people that usually 
read a book (watch a movie) is much greater than the num-
ber of people that usually write a book (direct/produce) a 
movie, and saliency is inversely proportional to these num-
bers; and (ii) our ontology typically has a specific name for 
those who write a book (author), and those who direct (di-
rector) or produce (producer) a movie. 
 
4 ONTOLOGICAL TYPES AND THE COPULAR 
Consider the following sentences involving two different 
uses of the copular ‘is’: 
 
 (40) a.  William H. Bonney is Billy the Kid.  
 b.  Liz is famous.  
 
The copular ‘is’ in (40a) is usually referred to as the ‘is of 
identity’ while that in (40b) as the ‘is of predication’ and the 
standard first-order logic translation of the sentences in (40) 
is usually given by (41a) and (41b), respectively (using whb 
for William H. Bonney and btk for Bill the Kid): 
 
(41) a.  whb btk=  
 b.  Famous Liz( )  
 
However, we argue that ‘is’ is not ambiguous but, like any 
other relation, it can occur in contexts in which an addi-
tional salient relation is implied, depending on the types of 
the objects involved. Thus, we have the following: 
 
(42)  whb is btk  
          
1 1∃ ∃ BE( :: )( :: )( ( , ))whb btk whb btk⇒ Human Human  
          
1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃⇒ Human Human EQwhb btk whb btk  
  
Note that since both objects are of the same type, BE in (42) 
is trivially translated into an equality. However, consider 
now the following: 
 
(43)  liz is famous  
 
1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )liz p⇒ Human Property  
       BE( ( ) ( :: , :: ))fame ∧p liz pHuman Property  
 
As we have done thus far, since no subsumption relation 
exists between Human and Property, some salient relation 
must be introduced, where the most salient relation between 
an object x and a property y is HAS(x,y), meaning that x has 
the property y: 
 
 liz is famous  
1∃( :: )⇒ liz Human  
          ∃ HAS( :: )( ( ) ( , ))famep p liz pProperty ∧  
 
Thus, saying that ‘Liz is famous’ is saying that there is some 
unique object named Liz, an object of type Human, and 
some Property p, such that Liz has that property. A similar 
analysis yields the following interpretations: 
 
(44)  
a.  aging is inevitable   
    
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )x y⇒ Process Property  
             HAS( ( ) ( ) ( , ))aging inevitabilityx y x y∧ ∧  
 
b.  fame is desirable   
    
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )x y⇒ Property Property  
             HAS( ( ) ( ) ( , ))fame desirabilityx y x y∧ ∧  
 
c.  sheba is dead   
    
1 1∃ ∃ IN( :: )( :: )( ( ) ( , ))deathx y y x y⇒ ∧Human State  
 
d.  jon is aging   
    
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )jon y⇒ Human Process  
            GT( ( ) ( , ))aging y x y∧  
 
That is, the Process of AGING has the Property of being in-
evitable (44a); the Property FAME has the (other) Property of 
being DESRIBALE (44b); sheba is in a (physical) State called 
DEATH (44c); and, finally, jon is going through (GT) a Proc-
ess called AGING (44d). Finally, consider the following 
well-known example (due, we believe, to Barbara Partee): 
 
(45)  a.  The temperature is 90. 
 b.  The temperature is rising. 
 c.  90 is rising. 
 
It has been argued that such sentences require an intensional 
treatment since a purely extensional treatment would make 
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(54a) and (45b) erroneously entail (45c). However, we be-
lieve that the embedding of ontological types into the prop-
erties and relations yields the correct entailments without 
the need for complex higher-order intensional formalisms. 
Consider the following: 
 
90  the temperature is  
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )Temperature Measurex y⇒  
       90( ( , )value y  
                 ( :: , :: ))∧BE x yTemperature Measure  
 
Since no subsumption relation exits between an object of 
type Temperature and an object of type Measure, the type 
unification in BE(x,y) should result in a salient relation 
between the two types, as follows; 
 
(46)  90  the temperature is  
 
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )x y⇒ Temperature Measure  
         90 x yHAS( ( , ) ( , ))value y ∧  
 
On the other hand, consider now the following: 
 
(47)   the temperature is rising   
 
1 1 x y∃ ∃ BE( :: )( :: )( ( , ))x y⇒ Temperature Process  
 
Again, as no subsumption relation exists between an object 
of type Temperature and an object of type Process, some 
salient relation between the two is introduced. However, in 
this case the salient relation is quite different; in particular, 
the relation is that of x-going-through the State y: 
 
(48)   the temperature is rising   
 
1 1∃ ∃( :: )( :: )x y⇒ Temperature Process  
                    GT( ( ) ( , ))rising y x y∧  
 
Note now that (46) and (48) yield the following, which es-
sentially says that ‘the temperature is 90 and it is rising’: 
 
1 1∃ ∃ ∃( :: )( :: )( :: )Temperature Measure Processx y z  
     90( ( ) ( , )rising valuez y∧  
  ( , ) ( , )))∧ ∧GTHAS x y x z  
 
Finally, note that uncovering the ontological commitments 
implied by the sentences in (45a) and (54b) will not result in 
the erroneous entailment of (45c). 
 Contrary to the situation in (45), however, uncovering 
the ontological commitments implied by some sentences 
should sometimes admit some valid entailments. For exam-
ple, consider the following: 
 
(49) a.  exercising is wise. 
 b.  jon is exercising. 
 c.  jon is wise. 
 
Clearly, (49a) and (49b) should entail (49c), although one 
can hardly think of attributing the property WISE to an Activ-
ity (EXERCISING). Let us see how we might explain this ar-
gument. We start with the simplest: 
(50)  jon is exercising  
 jon act1 1( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ Human Activity  
                  act act jon( ( ) ( , ))∧exercising agent  
 
Let us now consider the following: 
 
(51)  exercising is wise  
 a a( :: )( ( )∀⇒ Activity exercising  
        p p1( :: )( ( )∃⊃ Property wisdom  
                           a p( :: , ))HAS Human∧  
 
That is, any exercising Activity has a property, namely wis-
dom, which is a property that ordinarily an object of type 
Human has. Note, however, that a type unification for the 
variable a must now occur: 
 
(52)  jon is exercising  
 a a( :: ( ))( ( )•∀⇒ Activity Human exercising  
          p∃1( :: )⊃ Property  
   p a p( ( ) ( , ))HASwisdom ∧  
 
The most salient relation between a Human and an Activity is 
that of agency – that is, a human is typically the agent of 
an activity: 
 
(53)  jon is exercising  
 a x a( :: )( :: )( ( )∀ ∀⇒ Activity Human exercising  
           a x p
1( , ) ( :: )∃⊃ Property∧ agent  
                             p a p( ( ) ( , ))HAS∧wisdom  
 
Essentially, therefore, we get the following: any human x 
has the property of being wise whenever x is the agent of 
an exercising activity. Note now that (50), (53) and modes 
ponens results in the following, which is the meaning of 
‘jon is wise’: 
 
jon1( :: )∃ Human  
       p p x p
1( :: )( ( ) ( , ))∃ HASwisdom ∧Property  
 
Finally, note that the inference in (49) was proven valid 
only after uncovering the missing text, since ‘exercising is 
wise’ was essentially interpreted as ‘[any human that per-
forms the activity of] exercising is wise’. 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
If the main business of semantics is to explain how 
linguistic constructs relate to the world, then semantic 
analysis of natural language text is, indirectly, an attempt at 
uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense 
knowledge, and particularly the background knowledge that 
seems to be implicit in all that we say in our everyday 
discourse. While this intimate relationship between 
language and the world is generally accepted, semantics (in 
all its paradigms) has traditionally proceeded in one 
direction: by first stipulating an assumed set of ontological 
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commitments followed by some machinery that is supposed 
to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that stipulated 
structure of reality. 
With the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological 
commitments of our semantic formalisms and the reality of 
the world these formalisms purport to represent, it is not 
surprising therefore that challenges in the semantics of natu-
ral language are rampant. However, as correctly observed 
by Hobbs (1985), semantics could become nearly trivial if it 
was grounded in an ontological structure that is “isomorphic 
to the way we talk about the world”. The obvious question 
however is ‘how does one arrive at this ontological structure 
that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday dis-
course?’ One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) 
suggestion that the semantic analysis of natural language 
should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard 
we strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states: 
 
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical 
questions first, and then construct a meaning-
theory in light of the answers. We should investi-
gate how our language actually functions, and 
how we can construct a workable systematic de-
scription of how it functions; the answers to those 
questions will then determine the answers to the 
metaphysical ones. 
 
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that 
in our effort to understand the complex and intimate 
relationship between ordinary language and everyday 
commonsense knowledge, one could, as also suggested in 
(Bateman, 1995), “use language as a tool for uncovering the 
semiotic ontology of commonsense” since ordinary 
language is the best known theory we have of everyday 
knowledge. To avoid this seeming circularity (in wanting 
this ontological structure that would trivialize semantics; 
while at the same time suggesting that semantic analysis 
should itself be used as a guide to uncovering this 
ontological structure), we suggested here performing 
semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a minimal 
(almost a trivial and basic) ontology, in the hope of building 
up the ontology as we go guided by the results of the 
semantic analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) 
the ontology thus constructed as a result of this process 
would not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to 
ontology (e.g., Lenat, & Guha (1990); Guarino (1995); and 
Sowa (1995)), but would instead be discovered from what is 
in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in 
everyday discourse; (ii) the semantics of several natural 
language phenomena should as a result become trivial, since 
the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying 
knowledge structures (in a sense, the semantics would have 
been done before we even started!) 
 Throughout this paper we have tried to demonstrate that 
a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language 
can be easily tackled if semantics is grounded in a strongly-
typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the 
world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. 
Our ultimate goal, however, is the systematic discovery of 
this ontological structure, and, as also argued in Saba 
(2007), it is the systematic investigation of how ordinary 
language is used in everyday discourse that will help us 
discover (as opposed to invent) the ontological structure that 
seems to underlie all what we say in our everyday discourse. 
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